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Abstract 
Like most large-scale infrastructure projects, carbon dioxide (CO2) geological sequestration (GS) projects have multiple success 
criteria and multiple stakeholders. In this context “risk evaluation” encompasses multiple scales. Yet a risk management program 
aims to maximize the chance of project success by assessing, monitoring, minimizing all risks in a consistent framework. 
  
The 150,000-km2 Illinois Basin underlies much of the state of Illinois, USA, and parts of adjacent Kentucky and Indiana. Its 
potential for CO2 storage is first-rate among basins in North America, an impression that has been strengthened by early testing 
of the injection well of the Midwest Geological Sequestration Consortium’s (MGSC’s) Phase III large scale demonstration 
project, the Illinois Basin - Decatur Project (IBDP). The IBDP, funded by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Energy 
Technology Laboratory (NETL), represents a key trial of GS technologies and project-management techniques. Though risks are 
specific to each site and project, IBDP risk management methodologies provide valuable experience for future GS projects. 
  
IBDP views risk as the potential for negative impact to any of these five values: health and safety, environment, financial, 
advancing the viability and public acceptability of a GS industry, and research. Research goals include monitoring one million 
metric tonnes of injected CO2 in the subsurface. Risk management responds to the ways in which any values are at risk: for 
example, monitoring is designed to reduce uncertainties in parameter values that are important for research and system control, 
and is also designed to provide public assurance. Identified risks are the primary basis for risk-reduction measures: risks linked to 
uncertainty in geologic parameters guide further characterization work and guide simulations applied to performance evaluation. 
Formally, industry defines risk (more precisely risk criticality) as the product L*S, the Likelihood multiplied by the Severity of 
negative impact. L and S are each evaluated on five-point scales, yielding a theoretical spread in risk values of 1 through 25. So 
defined, these judgment-based values are categorical and ordinal – they do not represent physically measurable quantities, but are 
nonetheless useful for comparison and therefore decision support. The “risk entities” first evaluated are FEPs – conceptual 
Features, Events, and Processes based on the list published by Quintessa Ltd. After concrete scenarios are generated based on 
selected FEPs, scenarios become the critical entities whose associated risks are evaluated and tracked. 
In IBDP workshops, L and S values for 123 FEPs were generated through expert elicitation. About 30 experts in the project or in 
GS in general were assigned among six facilitated working groups, and each group was charged to envision risks within a sphere 
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of project operations. Working groups covered FEPs with strong spatial characteristics – such as those related to the injection 
wellbore and simulated plume footprint – and “nonspatial” FEPs related to finance, regulations, legal, and stakeholder issues. 
Within these working groups, experts shared information, examined assumptions, refined and extended the FEP list, calibrated 
responses, and provided initial L and S values by consensus. Individual rankings were collected in a follow-up process via 
emailed spreadsheets. For each of L and S, three values were collected: Lower Bound, Best Guess, and Upper Bound. The 
Lower-Upper Bound ranges and the spreads among experts can be interpreted to yield rough confidence measures. 
Based on experts’ responses, FEPs were ranked in terms of their L*S risk levels. FEP rankings were determined from individual 
(not consensus or averaged) results, thus no high-risk responses were damped out. The higher-risk FEPs were used to generate 
one or more concrete, well defined risk-bearing scenarios for each FEP. Any FEP scored by any expert as having associated risk 
of at least moderate level – roughly the top half of the evaluated list – was used to generate risk scenarios.  
Textual risk-response information collected during the FEP evaluation process was augmented after scenarios were defined. Risk 
responses were then disaggregated into approximately 200 risk-response actions, which were regrouped into 30 areas of function 
or expertise. Each “risk response action group” has been assigned to a specific individual to organize and confirm its execution. 
Responses to the higher identified risks have influenced plans for reservoir characterization, monitoring, communications, and 
coordination among project member organizations. Uncertainties in geologic parameters are being addressed through sensitivity 
analysis in reservoir simulations and through further data acquisition. Because the risk-bearing scenarios are linked to formal, 
assigned risk-response actions, they provide a basis for tracking and managing risk throughout the project. 
Important benefits of face-to-face, “live” expert elicitation include team formation and the subsequent establishment of project 
understandings, roles, and working relationships. Interchanges that occur during a FEPs-based elicitation process can stimulate 
conceiving and considering risk-bearing chains of events, and can help avoid blind spots that could occur if all scenarios were 
pre-defined. Through using both group-consensus and individual values, the IBDP risk management process benefited from 
group discussion and calibration, while avoiding the impairment of independent judgment that can arise through group dynamics. 
Further developments in collecting, analyzing, and managing the risk-evaluation data are expected to streamline risk management 
tasks, and to provide suitable risk management frameworks that are more broadly applicable to geological sequestration. 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved 
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1. Risk management workflow: Purpose and background 
In early 2008, Schlumberger Carbon Services, North America initiated a workflow to evaluate and manage 
project risk in the Midwest Geological Sequestration Consortium (MGSC) Phase III large-scale demonstration 
project, the Illinois Basin – Decatur Project (IBDP), funded by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Energy 
Technology Laboratory (NETL). The workflow’s two main objectives are (1) To ensure that all important risks are 
identified, and then (2) To reduce and/or hold them to acceptable levels. Achieving both objectives requires using 
detailed, specific processes and content, to create a sharp fulcrum where risk-reduction actions can be leveraged. Yet 
processes must also be neither over-designed nor overly prescriptive – for these flaws create the blind spots, and 
provide the cracks through which the most important risks can slip.  
Although scenarios – events well defined in subjects, objects, and verbs – are necessary to the design of effective 
interventions, we begin with FEPs (Features, Events, and Processes), which are conceptual, overlapping, and 
interwoven in ways not defined before the initial risk assessment. Morgan et al [1] noted that 
Scenarios analysis can be useful, but also carries risks. Specific detailed scenarios can become cognitively 
compelling, with the result that people may overlook many other pathways to the same end-points. It is often best 
to “cut the long causal chains” and focus on the possible range of a few key variables, which can most affect 
outcomes of interest. (p.74) 
c⃝ 1 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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2. Guiding principles 
The principles underlying the choices of emphasis and form of this risk-assessment methodology have many 
roots. Critical ideas that have guided method development can be found in the publications listed in Table 1, as well 
as in the references cited elsewhere in this paper.
Table 1: Key ideas that have influenced risk assessment and risk management methodology 
Publication Key ideas as interpreted and applied to methodology 
Kahneman et al, 1982, 
Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases [2] 
Judgments are affected by many heuristics – rules of thumb – that can impair accuracy. In 
particular, anchoring is unavoidable, but its harm can be decreased through an elicitation 
structure that first addresses the plausible range of a desired parameter, and then estimates 
its central or best-guess or mean value. 
Slovic, 1987, 
Perception of Risk [3] 
Perception of risk by nonspecialists is strongly influenced by factors besides likelihood 
and severity of impact, including dread, familiarity, and ability to control. Because most 
projects can proceed only with public goodwill and agreement (mediated through 
regulatory processes), perceived risks can also be critical to project success. 
Surowiecki, 2004, The 
Wisdom of Crowds [4] 
Under suitable conditions, a diverse group whose members possess distinct private 
information (in addition to shared public information) and who make independent 
judgments can produce aggregated (e.g. mean or median) parameter estimates that are 
more accurate than those given by any single, even expert, individual. 
Taleb, 2007, The 
Black Swan [5] 
Some rare events of extreme impact appear predictable only in hindsight. Statistically, 
they hew not to bell-curve but to power-law or other “fat-tail” distributions. To manage 
risk of negative impact from Black Swan events, one must envision extreme outcomes and 
build system robustness, and emphasize impact mitigation rather than event prevention. 
3. Project risk management in the context of geosequestration (GS) risk assessment 
The central function of risk assessment at the project scale is to provide decision support for project management; 
most pointedly, to rationalize the allocation of resources for actions taken to reduce risk within the project. In the 
semi-quantitative method addressed by this paper, the calculated quantity defined as “Risk” is compared with pre-
defined thresholds for risk treatment as established by the project partners (private companies, public funding 
agencies, and other sponsors). The key early output is a list of scenarios, prioritized by level of risk, coupled with a 
set of risk response actions intended to reduce the larger risks. 
The workflow discussed in this paper and previously [6] does not produce a calibrated, aggregated measure of 
GS project risk that might be compared with similarly derived measures for other projects or sites. Several softwares 
and methodologies do enable comparing candidate GS project sites on a risk basis, including CarbonSCORE2 [7], 
CO2QualStoreTM (DNV), CASSIFTM (TNO), and RISQUETM (URS). There are also methods that support risk-based 
single-site evaluations by regulatory authorities, including Vulnerability Evaluation Framework (U.S. E.P.A.) [8] 
and Certification Framework [9]. Another group of risk-related workflows focuses on physics-based process 
models, and allows investigating the likelihood that stored CO2 will leak via defined pathways (e.g. wells, faults, or 
confining zones) at a specific storage site. Lastly, system models such as CO2-PENS (Los Alamos National 
Laboratory) integrate physics-based and purely probabilistic elements to produce arrays of risked GS-project 
outcomes using Monte Carlo methods. The workflow developed for IBDP can be used to develop perspective upon 
the scenarios and ranges of parameter variation that should be addressed by process and system models; however, its 
key function is to identify and minimize risks to success within a single specific project. 
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4. Data-capture methods in initial project risk assessment 
Expert-elicitation methodology (risk assessment data capture) and initial results from IBDP are discussed in [6]. 
Core aspects of the IBDP methodology, beginning with the initial workshop, are listed in Table 2. Method 
improvements in risk assessment efforts for projects that have started after IBDP are discussed in Section 8. 
Table 2. Features of IBDP initial risk-assessment process 
Feature Description 
Project status at time of 
risk assessment workshop 
Injection location had been narrowed to within ~100 m; project partnership and 
funding had been secured; designs were in progress for injection well, for well- and 
surface-based geologic characterization, and for injection monitoring. 
Time constraint Workshop duration: 1.5 days including information sharing and method training.  
Expert-panel composition 29 experts in project physical and cultural setting, geology, engineering, and/or 
operations plans, including 4 experts external to project. 
Available information Experts’ long-term professional experience in analogous projects, and project-specific 
information presented in plenary session. 
Evaluated entities 123 generic FEPs – Features, Events, and Processes – selected and augmented from 
the Quintessa CO2 Risk Database (current version [10]). 
At-risk entities Five defined project values, embracing environmental, health and safety, 
technical/research, financial, and industry stewardship concerns. 
Evaluation criterion “Risk”, defined as R=L*S, where L=Likelihood and S=Severity of negative impact. 
L and S scales Five-point categorical scales, such that 1  L*S  25.  
(the “S” scale uses negative numbers to represent negative impact, so L*S is also negative)
Elicitation format Six working groups addressed sets of FEPs reflecting different subject matter, and 
produced results through working-group consensus.  
Individual results were provided through follow-up emailed spreadsheets. 
Collected data Numerical scores of L and S: Lower-Bound, Upper-Bound, and Best-Guess values 
for each FEP, totaling 1122 group-consensus and 6939 individual- respondent values. 
Text: 232 comments (4400 words) on risk scenarios and risk responses. 
To summarize, the initial risk-assessment process (workshops plus followup) for IBDP yielded 
• a collective body of starting information upon which risk evaluation was based; 
• a platform for experts’ evaluation of each other’s information and judgments; 
• numerical evaluations by groups and individuals of risk associated with each of 123 FEPs;  
• a ranking of the 123 FEPs by their associated risk level; and 
• textual information identifying specific risk sources, event pathways, and risk-reduction opportunities. 
This paper focuses on the application of the gathered IBDP risk-assessment data toward risk management. 
5. Applying risk-assessment data towards risk management 
5.1 Text information 
As noted in Table 2, the IBDP risk assessment process collected more than 4400 words of participant 
commentary. Comments were collected primarily from spreadsheets that were completed and emailed during the 
month following the workshops. The comments were of two types: 
a) Detailed scenarios involving one or more specific FEPs. This example could have been written for the FEP 
identified as Reservoir Porosity: “Log data acquired after the intended injection well is drilled shows that 
porosity in the target injection zone is only 10%, instead of 15% assumed in the pre-drilling models; 
consequently, injecting the planned CO2 mass will cause plume migration beyond the permitted area.” A 
scenario that can be used for risk management must have subject and object (typically Features), actions 
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expressed in verbs (Events and Processes), and negative impacts upon one of the five defined values. 
Participants in the original risk workshop submitted more than 100 such scenarios. 
b) Suggested actions to reduce risk. Risk-reduction actions may be preventive – meaning they are intended to 
reduce the likelihood that negative impact will occur – or mitigative, meaning they are intended to reduce 
the severity of impact. In either case, the overall intent is to move the L and S attributes of a Scenario toward 
the blue-shaded “acceptable” area in the upper left corner of a risk matrix such as shown in Figure 1. About 
100 risk responses were offered by participants in the original workshop. 
Using all text and numerical information that had been collected from the original workshop participants, a 
smaller group refined, clarified, and augmented the scenarios and risk reductions. The smaller group ensured that 
scenarios existed in relation to each FEP that ranked, by associated risk, in the upper half of the FEP list. This 
process yielded a list of 88 refined, concrete scenarios relevant to the high-ranking FEPs. The scenarios themselves 
can also be ranked by risk, as described in the next section. Because risk evaluations and risk rankings are project-
specific, they cannot be mapped onto other projects and are therefore not given in this paper. However, a brief 
synthesis of observations from multiple project risk evaluations to date is given in Section 7.  
5.2 Numerical information 
A many-to-many relationship is inherent between FEPs and scenarios. Each scenario is written in relation to a 
single FEP, but it normally involves multiple FEPs, and any FEP may participate in multiple scenarios. Despite this 
overlap, an imprecise risk ranking of scenarios can be derived from the L and S values of its associated FEPs. For 
IBDP, the highest-ranked scenarios (depending on how rankings are computed) tend to involve challenges of 
organizational and operating-system integration; public concern about effects of injection upon groundwater and 
seismicity; lack of adequate injectivity; unanticipated leakage pathways; and budgetary concerns. Logically, the 
highest-ranked scenarios are due the most dedicated allocation of project resources in pursuit of risk reduction. 
Each risk reduction action was given in response to a scenario. Each action can be linked through its associated 
scenarios to a set of associated FEPs, but there is much overlap and non-uniqueness in such a process: Multiple risk 
reductions may ultimately reference the same set of FEPs. So, while the risk values of a set of associated FEPs 
suggest a level of urgency for action, this stage of the process does not provide an evaluation of the importance of 
any given risk-reduction measure. Moreover, the potential effectiveness of a proposed risk reduction has yet to be 
considered. For this reason, the rationalization, execution, and effectiveness evaluation of risk-reduction measures is 
undertaken as a project management function, delegated to specified persons responsible for groups of risk 
reduction-actions. This structure is described in Section 6. 
Figure 1. Risk matrix based on five-category Likelihood and 
Severity scales. “Xs” show plotted positions of hypothetical FEPs
 or Scenarios. Modified after Schlumberger Hazard Analysis and 
Risk Control Standard SLB-QHSE-S020.
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6. Risk Response Action Groups and RACI assignments 
In response to the 88 risk-bearing scenarios that were generated for corresponding higher-ranked FEPs, a small 
team identified 201 Risk Response Actions. The actions were grouped by topic (Table 3), and each Risk Response 
Action Group was assigned to an individual whose role in the project is centrally concerned with that topic.  
The assigned individual acts as the “R” person in the “RACI” (responsible, accountable, consulted, informed) 
constellation of task-assignment roles, and is responsible for seeing that actions are completed. Other individuals are 
“accountable” (often the “R” person’s supervisor), “to be consulted with”, or “to be informed”. RACI assignments 
become more challenging in projects involving multiple organizations that lack an overall personnel structure. Each 
“R” person also evaluates whether the actions are sufficient to adequately reduce risk in the associated scenarios, 
and is charged to envision additional risk scenarios as the project evolves. The project’s overall risk manager further 
reviews the status and effectiveness of risk response, and instigates formal risk reviews at junctures when there are 
significant updates to project data or changes in the project’s environment. The same five-point “Likelihood” and 
“Severity” scales originally used to evaluate the FEPs are also used to evaluate risk in scenarios, before and after the 
risk response actions. 
Table 3. Risk Response Action Groups 
ID Risk Response Action Group Title 
OE01 QHSE PLAN: SUBSURFACE AND SEISMIC OPERATIONS 
OE02 QHSE PLAN: SURFACE AND INJECTION OPERATIONS 
OE03 SITE SECURITY PLAN 
OE04 DRILLING PLANS, DEEP WELLS 
OE05 COMPLETION PLAN: IN-ZONE WELLS 
OE06 COMPLETION PLAN: GEOPHONE WELLS 
OE07 COMPLETION PLAN: SHALLOW GROUNDWATER MONITORING WELLS 
OE08 CO2-RESISTANT WELL CONSTRUCTION, IN-ZONE WELLS 
OE09 INJECTION OPERATIONS ENVELOPE 
OE10 INJECTION OPERATIONS AND SHUT-IN PLAN 
OE11 EQUIPMENT SPARING PLAN 
OE12 OPERATIONAL MONITORING PLAN 
PM01 OVERALL RISK MANAGEMENT 
PM02 PERMITS 
PM03 DATA MANAGEMENT PLAN 
PM04 BUDGET 
PM05 STAFF AND COORDINATION 
PM08 COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
PM12 INJECTIVITY BACKUP PLAN 
PM13 CO2 MOVEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN 
PM14 GOAL TRIAGE 
PM15 COMMUNICATIONS PLAN 
SR01 SITE SELECTION AND AREA OF REVIEW 
SR02 POTABLE-AQUIFER BASELINE CHEMISTRY 
SR03 RESERVOIR CHARACTERIZATION PLAN: IN-ZONE WELLS 
SR06 MONITORING PLAN 
SR08 SURFACE SEISMIC 
SR09 STATIC EARTH MODEL 
SR10 SIMULATION PLAN 
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7. Observations from multiple project risk assessments
Since the inception of the IBDP risk assessment and management program in 2008, initial assessments have been 
performed for five additional projects in North America. The resulting data, though scant, suggest the following 
generalizations [11]: 
• Risk levels associated with certain FEPs tend to be highly specific to the site and/or project; that is, the 
relative risk ranking of certain FEPs has varied greatly among different projects. Such FEPs include 
obviously site-specific factors such as the presence or absence of faults and orphaned boreholes, the 
characteristics of the local community, and the potential for contaminating potable groundwater or of 
inducing earthquakes. Yet for both groundwater and seismicity, results of a limited inquiry suggest that 
the rank volatility results mainly not from differences in local geology, but from differences in public 
perceptions of risk. 
• Risk levels associated with certain other FEPs have been stable across evaluated projects, either high or 
low. For example, relatively high risk has been consistently ascribed to FEPs addressing project 
organizational challenges (such as Schedule and Planning), and to FEPs addressing local community 
reactions. Relatively low risk has been consistently ascribed to FEPs addressing secondary seals or 
confining zones. 
The emergence of a set of FEPs consistently evaluated as low risk will assist in the FEP pre-screening stage of 
future risk assessments. Although this streamlines the initial process in identifying FEPs for which a full initial 
evaluation is less critical, we recommend that the adequacy of risk reductions always be reckoned against lists of 
FEPs and scenarios that are as full and extensive as possible. Each new FEP created using project-specific details 
should be added to the growing and never-completed roster for all projects to consider. 
8. Further method developments 
In the initial project risk assessments conducted so far, fundamental aspects of the methodology have worked well, 
including the starting focus on FEPs, explicit definition of project values, and five-point evaluation of Likelihood 
and Severity of negative impact, whose product defines Risk. Certain alterations have improved the interchange of 
information and immediate feedback among workshop participants, making the process swifter, more engaging, 
quicker to produce usable results, and more amenable to extensive text capture. This list cites some of the important 
changes [11]:  
• Discussion and evaluation are held mainly in plenary session, rather than in working groups. 
• Participants self-assess and report their own areas of expertise. 
• Captured data values are refined to three values per FEP instead of six – yet we still explicitly evaluate the 
severity range. 
• Wireless keypads are used to capture individual quantitative values. 
For future development we envision even more extensive and more nuanced use of real-time data capture from 
individual participants, a more varied palette of expert-elicitation instruments (“questionnaire formats”), and direct 
elicitation of probability density functions for key simulation parameters. 
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9. Conclusions 
A FEPs-based methodology for risk assessment and management has been applied in several North American 
projects. In effect, FEPs ranked through expert elicitation, according to their associated risk, are used as selective 
mental stimulants for identifying the most important scenarios from which negative impacts may issue. These 
scenarios then provide the tangible and temporal malignant chains of events against which interventions – risk 
reductions – can be designed. 
Risks to the success of a geosequestration project are obviously inherent in the geoengineering practice of 
compressing, transporting, and injecting CO2 underground; leakage risk must obviously form a long-term focus of 
the practice of GS risk management. Yet for GS to succeed as a greenhouse-gas mitigation measure – which of 
course is the point – all risks to project success must be adequately managed. In this vein, risks perceived by project 
financiers and by stakeholders other than the proponents are of no lesser importance. According to the NETL 
manual Best Practices for Public Outreach and Education for Carbon Storage Projects [12], 
Perceptions that may seem exaggerated from a technical point of view must be taken seriously. Perceived 
risks are no less “real” for purposes of implementing a public outreach program. If these concerns are not 
addressed by project developers, they can rapidly transform into public opposition … 
… which can rapidly transform into permit delays or denial. 
A successful project, 30 or 40 years from now, will have been one whose risks were broadly envisioned, but 
discretely, concretely, and repeatedly countered from the start. It will have been one in which risks were envisioned 
and re-envisioned through as many different lenses and from as many different points of view as could be mustered. 
And it will be one in which not all risks that motivate us to respond need be reckoned in numbers – because Black 
Swan scenarios drop unbidden from the sky, they do not paddle predictable paths in the lake. 
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